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Abstract 
Putting climate neutrality on the urban agenda inevitably requires a re-
imagination and delineation of the boundaries of the city, both at the 
geographical level, with regard to its inscription in history and concerning the 
social groups it is composed of. Such an exercise of (re-)imagination or 
representation is a profoundly political act. It is on the level of this symbolic 
representation that the (de)politicised nature of sustainability projects must 
be assessed.  
LKN2030, a project which aims to make the city of Leuven (Belgium) carbon 
neutral by 2030, is a case in point. The way it delineates its spatial boundaries, 
inscribes itself in time and conceives of the main actors representing the city 
generates profound forms of depoliticisation. Our contention is that these can 
explain some of the obstacles the project currently faces, whereas it initially 
triggered a lot of enthusiasm. Though mechanisms of in- and exclusion and 
agenda-setting inevitably take place in every sustainability project, in 
LKN2030 these choices tend to be neutralised behind a technical, managerial 
and scientific discourse. As a result, the project risks to translate potentially 
interesting dynamics into a consensual project for urban renewal and city 
marketing, whereby sustainability goals are reframed into marketing 
objectives and economic opportunities. Drawing on post-foundational 
political theory, this paper assesses this evolution, but also explores the 
potential of forms of repoliticisation that are emerging in its wake. 
 
‘Rather than seeing the climate challenge only as a burden,  
Leuven has all interest in considering it as a unique opportunity.’ 
Project Proposal Leuven Climate Neutral 
 
1. Introduction 
Overlooking the landscape of contemporary climate politics, three tendencies 
can be observed. First, international climate negotiations have led to 
successive failures, symbolised by wafer-thin agreements, lack of substantial 
commitments and raising global CO2 emissions. Even the 2015 Paris 
agreement, which represents a substantial step in international climate 
action, remains largely insufficient to ward off runaway climate change. 
Second, we see an ongoing attempt to reframe the climate challenge in more 
market-oriented terms, as a chance to reform and recover the market 
economy, a tendency which is especially epitomised by the emerging green 
economy discourse (Mueller and Bullard, 2011; Mueller and Passadakis, 2010; 
self-reference). Third, there is a tenacious tendency to represent the climate 
crisis in consensual, managerial and technocratic, or in other words, 
depoliticised terms (Bettini, 2013; Goeminne, 2010; MacGregor, 2014; 
Machin, 2013; Maeseele, 2015; Pepermans and Maeseele 2014; self-
reference; Swyngedouw, 2007; 2010; 2013). The emergence of a myriad of 
city-level initiatives to tackle climate change is symptomatic of all these 
trends. The decreasing hope to realise far-going climate action on an 
international level has strengthened the idea that initiatives should be taken 
on lower scales, such as the city. This is also supposed to be an ideal level to 
experiment with green economy scenarios, new forms of governance and 
multistakeholder participation (LSE Cities, 2013; UNEP, 2011; UNICE, 2011). 
The idea is that the transition towards a more sustainable society could be 
realised through the ‘viral’ spread of city-level initiatives set up by 
‘enlightened’ city councils, often in collaboration with entrepreneurs and 
other ‘frontrunners’, who would not wait for decisions from above to take 
action (Jones and De Meyere, 2009).  
A typical example is the case of Leuven Klimaatneutraal 2030 
(LKN2030), ‘Leuven Carbon Neutral 2030’. Leuven is a small city of about 
100.000 inhabitants, situated in the Dutch-speaking part of Belgium on a 
distance of about 20 km from Brussels. It has few industries, but houses one 
of the largest universities in the country (KU Leuven), which has more than 
11.000 staff members and 40.000 students. In 2011, the city not only signed 
the EU Covenant of Mayors, but also took the initiative to go a step further 
and set up a transition pathway towards carbon neutrality in 2030. The aim 
of the project is to realise ‘net zero CO2 emissions by the way we live, dwell, 
work, transport ourselves’ (LKN2030, 2016). While t
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triggered a lot of enthusiasm, it faces major obstacles today. While these 
obstacles are complex and diverse, this article particularly focuses on the key 
question of how LKN2030 has dealt – or failed to deal – with the inevitably 
political dimension of such a profound process of change. The aim of this 
paper is to provide a theoretically grounded analysis of the ways in which the 
specific imagination of the carbon neutral city, particularly in terms of its 
spatial and temporal dimensions and its social composition, can lead to 
processes of depoliticisation. Key questions in this context are what kind of 
image a city gives of itself, how it draws its boundaries, views the composition 
of its population or imagines its geographical and historical inscription, and to 
what extent these representations can be considered as (de)politicised. At the 
same time, as we will show, the symbolic shift resulting from the emerging 
discourse on urban climate neutrality also generates a potential for forms of 
repoliticisation. The argument of the paper proceeds as follows. We first 
provide a short sketch of the project, its main developments and its key 
features. Subsequently, we discuss the debate about the concept of the 
‘political’, mainly drawing on post-foundational political theory (Marchart, 
2007). We argue that (de)politicisation in a project for climate neutrality 
relates to how the city is imagined, represented or given meaning. In the 
fourth section, this argument will be brought to bear on the spatial, temporal 
and social imagination underpinning the project of LKN 2030. In order to 
illustrate these points, we will shortly elaborate three cases of forms of 
opposition or agonism which developed within the framework of LKN2030: 
the case of a planned underground parking plot, the case of the ‘Parkveld’ 
movement advocating sustainable urban agriculture, and the case of a real 
estate project developer failing to live up expectations. We argue that despite 
the depoliticised nature of its representation of space, time and its 
composition, the symbolic shift which LKN2030 produces also creates the 
framework for new potential forms of repoliticisation. The symbolic 
inscription of the long-term goal of climate neutrality provides critical civil 
society actors with the discursive tools to attempt to repoliticise the 
processes at stake. As we will conclude, the empty signifier ‘climate neutrality’ 
does not only open the door for its appropriation by a green economy 
discourse or for city marketing, but can also provide the frame for new forms 
of opposition and repoliticisation. 
 
  
2. LKN2030: the emergence of a project 
The idea to make Leuven carbon neutral by 2030 was launched in 2011 by a 
number of scholars from the University of Leuven, who quickly found a willing 
ear with the responsible alderman. Inspired by literature on transition 
management (Kemp et al., 2007; Loorbach, 2007; Loorbach and Rotmans, 
2006; Rotmans, 2003), the project was framed as a multi-actor engagement 
in which the city’s key social actors (policy-makers, business sectors, academic 
institutions, civil society actors and utility companies) would be involved. 
Through dialogue and in consensus, a number of transition paths would be 
set up which should enable Leuven to become carbon neutral by 2030 (Jones 
et al., 2012). As regards funding, the project would rely on ‘common efforts 
by the city, the university and the business world’ (Jones et al., 2012). 
A combination of operational and strategic transition management 
was supposed to integrate a bottom-up and a top-down approach (Jones et 
al., 2012; Vandevyvere et al., 2013). Via six thematic cells (energy, built 
environment, mobility, agriculture and nature, consumption, transition and 
participation) actors and experts ‘from the bottom up’ were invited to bring 
in their expertise and commitment. A number of climate parliaments, through 
which a few hundred people voluntarily participated in the project, allowed 
citizens to express their points of view and bring in relevant ideas or expertise. 
At the same time, a transition arena, named the G20, was launched, 
embodying a ‘top-down approach’ in which ‘visionary and important key 
actors’ would take the fore  (Jones et al., 2012; see also Jones and De Meyere, 
2009; Loorbach, 2007; Loorbach and Rotmans, 2006; Rotmans and Loorbach, 
2009; self-reference). Including 20 ‘visionary system thinkers’ (from the city 
council, businesses, civil society and the university), its aim was to reflect on 
the high-level strategic choices the city should make. The combination of the 
transition arena with the thematic cells and climate parliaments was not only 
aimed at building the necessary knowledge base and generating real impact, 
but was also supposed to facilitate what the initiative called a ‘citywide 
3 
 
project’ and a ‘unique participation process’ (LKN2030, 2012a). Importantly, 
these structures only operated during the launching period of the project. 
Since its official start in 2013, a nonprofit association, chaired by the 
responsible alderman and consisting of 15 actors (from the city government, 
business sectors, knowledge institutions, civil society and (semi-)public 
utilities), has become the key agent in the transition process. In analogy to the 
earlier thematic cells, a few dozens of ’yards’, working on issues such as 
collaborative renovation of houses, car sharing or the local production of 
renewable energy, complement the main steering body in order to acquire a 
wider outreach and participation. 
While the projection of Leuven as the first climate neutral city of 
Belgium initially triggered quite some enthusiasm, and a lot of actors became 
involved in a short lapse of time, gradually the project lost some of its 
momentum, as a number of critiques, questions and doubts started to 
emerge. In this article, we will discuss a number of these shortages, 
particularly in relation to the issue of depoliticisation, a concept which has 
become the linchpin of a novel form of ideology critique. 
 
3. Post-politics as representation 
For as long as the word ‘politics’ exists, it has been associated with the city, 
the polis. Cities have provided the setting for defining the very concept of 
politics, including the meaning and scope of democracy, citizenship, in- and 
exclusion etcetera (Arendt, 1998; Balibar, 1998). However, critical scholars 
have increasingly drawn attention to processes through which cities have 
recently become the sites of technocratic forms of policy-making, governance 
arrangements and city marketing, all of which have been referred to as ‘post-
political’ (Harvey, 2012; Heynen et al., 2006; Swyngedouw, 2005, 2009; 
Swyngedouw and Kaika, 2014). What is of the essence of politics, it is argued, 
including the struggle for power between actors defending alternative visions 
on city life, is increasingly misrecognised or sidelined in favour of more 
consensual, technocratic and market-oriented approaches. 
At the same time, this introduction of the notions of post-politics and 
depoliticisation into (urban) sustainability studies (Swyngedouw, 2009; 
Swyngedouw and Kaika, 2014) sparked some controversy, as other scholars 
have criticised these concepts for misrecognising the democratic processes 
and forms of pluralism that actually exist (Chatterton et al., 2013; 
Featherstone, 2013; Larner, 2014; McCarthy, 2013; North, 2010; Urry, 2011). 
It is important, therefore, to clarify some conceptual issues in relation to the 
notion of ‘post-politics’ in order to avoid it becomes an empty slogan which 
can be applied too easily on almost everything.  
The political is a complex concept, full of paradoxes. This is especially 
because stating that something is political is not just a description of fact, but 
has a performative thrust: to call something political is itself a political act, 
just as calling something non-political is. As Carl Schmitt famously stated, ‘any 
decision about whether something is unpolitical is always a political decision’ 
(Schmitt, 1988). In other words, statements that something ought to be 
beyond politics often have a political significance. In this sense, Anthony 
Giddens’ (2009) argument that ‘(c)limate change should be lifted out of a 
right-left context, where it has no place’ could be read as a highly political 
statement with important implications for the right-left opposition. Another 
such paradox relates to the well-known statement that ‘everything is political’ 
(Bensaïd, 1997). Would it not be the case that if everything is political, nothing 
is (Marchart, 2007; Rancière, 1999)?  
The crux of the matter is that we cannot state that certain social 
relations, acts or things are intrinsically or essentially political, while others 
are not. Fundamentally, the political is about how things are discursively 
represented, given meaning, imagined (self-reference). Following Lefort 
(1986, 1988), we could even argue that ‘the political’ is the order of symbols 
and significations, or ‘the symbolic order’ through which society is given 
meaning. Representation is key, in other words: it is through the 
representations that accompany practices of governing, struggling or deciding 
that a meaning is given to what living together in a society means and entails. 
Or, to put it differently, an act is political precisely because it has a specific 
meaning, and embodies a specific vision on how (e.g. urban) society should 
be organised, and according to which principles. The key question then 
becomes whether discourses through which the act of governing is signified 
acknowledge their political nature and purport. 
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In this perspective, it is our contention that notions such as ‘the 
political’ and ‘depoliticisation’ should be considered as the linchpins of a novel 
form of ideology critique (self-reference). While older traditions of ideology 
critique aimed at uncovering how ideology distorts or conceals social 
relations, expresses hidden social or economic interests, or is the expression 
of hegemonic projects (e.g. Gramsci, 1998; Parekh, 1982), this novel form of 
ideology critique adopts another perspective: it does not ask what is ‘behind’ 
the discourse, but whether it acknowledges within itself that it has a political, 
and therefore contingent and contestable nature.  
In this article, we use the terms post-politics and depoliticisation 
interchangeably. We actually prefer the term ‘depoliticisation’, as the notion 
of ‘post-politics’ problematically suggests a historical succession has taken 
place whereby we were once political and now no longer. Depoliticisation also 
allows us better to single out particular discourses for critique, while post-
politics often refers to a whole era, a period, or a ‘condition’. One of the 
reasons why we still use the term post-politics as well, is that this is the term 
which was used by a number of post-foundational authors which inspire our 
analysis (Mouffe, 2006; Žižek, 2000), while depoliticisation is an older term, 
which also has been given other meanings than the one intended here (e.g. 
Castoriadis, 2010). 
Simply put, in the context of this article those discourses are analysed 
as depoliticised that misrecognise their character as discourses, as social 
constructions which are contingent, but nevertheless (co-)constitutive of our 
current form of society, and which can generate exclusions or render us blind 
to the necessity or possibility to act or commit ourselves. Different authors 
have approached this issue in slightly different terms, but the 
representational misrecognition of power, exclusion and contingency are red 
threads throughout the debate on post-politics and depoliticisation 
(Marchart, 2007; Mouffe, 1993, 2006, 2013; Rancière, 1999, 2001, 2005; 
Žižek, 2000).  
In the context of this paper, a relevant question is what kind of 
representation does the discourse of LKN2030 give of the city? What 
imaginary of city life is behind it? How does it represent urban change, the 
actors involved and the processes they engage in? How does it imagine the 
spatio-temporal configuration within which transition ought to take place? An 
increasing amount of literature criticises multistakeholder, managerial and 
governance discourses precisely for the way in which they fail to acknowledge 
or provide a place for radical plurality, conflict and dissensus, the contestation 
of exclusions, and the power relations they are engaged in (Deneault, 2013; 
Mair, 2006; Offe, 2009; self-reference; Swyngedouw, 2005). A key question 
guiding this paper is how sustainability projects such as LKN2030 are affected 
by such forms of depoliticisation and how this impacts upon the project’s 
effectiveness and democratic potential.  
Projects for carbon neutral cities exhibit a strange paradox in this 
regard. The transformations they intend to realise are quite substantial and 
even radical, while their discourse on partnerships, win-win situations and 
multistakeholder cooperation fails to adequately grasp the inevitable trade-
offs and difficult decisions and choices that will have to be made. Moreover, 
even though creating an attractive ‘Leitbild’ (leading image) is key to the kind 
of transition process LKN2030 engages in (Loorbach, 2007), no real 
recognition is given to the fact that realising climate neutrality implies a 
fundamental, and politically significant transformation of social and political 
values and priorities. As we will argue, this will turn the process of making 
Leuven climate neutral into a politically charged process, but one which is not 
recognised as such.  
Significantly, the project does have important symbolic effects, as a 
result of which the novel imagination of the city, its spatial boundaries, its 
temporality and its composition can become starting points for processes of 
repoliticisation. Indeed, as Chantal Mouffe (2002, 2006) or Slavoj Žižek (2000) 
have argued, the political dimension cannot be simply wished away, but will 
always remain present underneath the surface, and therefore risks to return 
in different guises. Inevitably, ‘the disappearance of the political in a 
postpolitical arrangement leaves all manner of traces that allow for the 
resurfacing of the properly political’ (Swyngedouw, 2009). In our discussion 
of LKN2030, we will therefore also discuss critical points of (potential) 
repoliticisation. 
 




Projecting a future climate neutral city requires imagining the city, its 
boundaries and its development in particular ways. It entails an act through 
which the city is carved out as a specific, bounded place distinguished from its 
‘environment’, embedded in a specific temporality or historicity, and 
composed of specific groups of people. In other words, imagining the city 
implies answering questions about ‘where’, ‘when’ and ‘who’: in which 
geography and history is the city inscribed, and who is part of it? In order to 
assess LKN2030 from the point of view of ‘the political’, this section will 
analyse how Leuven is socially constructed as the object of climate 
neutralisation through specific symbolic or discursive strategies. 
 
 
4.1. Where is the city? The impossible place of climate neutrality 
 
First and foremost, the project of the carbon neutral city entails a specific 
spatial delineation of the city, a process whereby contestable choices and 
decisions are made. What will be included in the effort to make Leuven 
climate neutral, and what will not? Evidently, the city is embedded in a 
broader, complex metabolism composed of flows of energy, matter, and 
waste (Heynen et al., 2006). Which flows or aspects of them will be 
considered as part of the ‘city’, and which will be abstracted from? Projecting 
a climate neutral city entails the inevitable but impossible attempt to carve 
out a space within this broader metabolism. On the one hand, such a 
reduction of complexity is the condition of possibility for the project, as it 
allows its protagonists to identify strategies and priorities for climate 
neutralisation within a clearly circumscribed location. On the other hand, it is 
an impossible task: how to meaningfully disentangle the broader metabolism 
and claim that climate neutrality is reachable while abstracting from certain 
dimensions of this metabolism? Leaving out certain flows from the broader 
metabolism is a relatively contingent and arbitrary act, making the concept of 
carbon neutrality vulnerable. Drawing inspiration from Derrida’s notion of 
undecidability (Derrida, 1992, 1994; Marchart, 2007), we can argue that it is 
precisely in this aporia between the necessity to make a decision on which 
part of a city’s metabolism to include, and the impossibility to make a final 
and grounded decision on this issue, that a space of political contestability 
resides.  
How did this process of constructing the boundaries of the city within 
a broader metabolism proceed in the case of LKN2030? In order to set out a 
transition path, the main sources of emissions on the territory of Leuven were 
first mapped through a baseline measurement (LKN2030, 2012b; 
Vanderheyden et al., 2012). Three types of emissions were distinguished: the 
direct emissions which result from activities taking place in Leuven, such as 
heating buildings, transport or industrial processes (scope 1); indirect 
emissions generated elsewhere for the production of energy consumed in 
Leuven (scope 2); and indirect emissions generated elsewhere through the 
production of goods and services consumed by inhabitants of Leuven, or 
which result from inhabitants’ activities taking place outside of Leuven, such 
as commuting or travelling abroad (scope 3).  
Significantly, the plan to make Leuven carbon neutral only concerns 
scope 1 and 2 emissions, which in 2010 would have constituted a total of 
808.000 ton CO2eq for the whole city. The project outline justifies this 
decision by stating that calculating scope 3 emissions is difficult and that the 
project’s capacity to control these emissions is limited. Yet, this decision has 
important political implications. From a metabolic perspective, one cannot 
possibly understand the life of the city without including a number of 
activities taking place far beyond its institutional boundaries. As Swyngedouw 
and Kaika (2014) argue, the socio-metabolic logics of the urban cannot be 
constricted to the institutional boundaries of the city: ‘a much greater number 
of people that often do not live in places defined as “cities” are directly or 
indirectly involved in ensuring the continuation of the global urbanization 
process’. Indeed, city-level carbon neutrality projects most often partake in 
spatially uneven transition processes, combining the continued consumption 
of emission-intensive goods produced far away with eco-technologies nearby. 
Referring to 19th century textile production, Jason Moore (2015) states 
that ‘for every Manchester’ there is ’a Mississippi Delta’, thus pointing out the 
blind spot of an exclusive focus by political economists on what happens 
within the factory. We can paraphrase this by stating there is no Leuven 
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without resource extraction, agricultural activities, industries and 
transportation networks reaching out to the other side of the planet. That the 
contribution of these activities on the level of greenhouses gases is significant 
is evidenced by the fact that scope 3 emissions are estimated to be at least as 
high as scope 1 and 2 emissions combined. Importantly, the impact of scope 
3 emissions need not only be searched for at the other side of the globe, but 
also relates to nearby (agricultural) practices. Sustainable urban agriculture 
initiatives exactly try to bring (food) production close to home again 
(Tornaghi, 2014). An important side effect of the decision to exclude scope 3 
emissions from the purview of LKN 2030 is that the importance of such 
initiatives is thus downplayed.  
On the basis of this restrictive definition of the spatial boundaries of 
the city, ‘buildings’ and ‘mobility’ became priority targets as they turned out 
to represent the largest share of emissions, respectively 60% and 25%. In so 
far as agricultural activities already have a place on the territory of Leuven, 
they are included in scope 1. But beyond that there is in LKN2030 no incentive 
to make food production more sustainable by localizing it (e.g. promoting 
‘food not lawns’ initiatives, turning city parks into edible parks, advancing 
urban bee keeping, or freeing place into the city for urban food gardens to 
give just a few examples of practices which have been central to other 
transition initiatives (Mason and Whitehead, 2012; Neal, 2013; self-reference; 
Tornaghi and Van Dijck, 2015)). To put it metaphorically, on the level of scope 
1 and 2 emissions, it does not matter if the trees in the park are oaks or pear 
trees. But it does matter for climate neutrality in the broader sense of the 
word. 
This is not only a theoretical argument. Action groups and NGOs 
working on sustainable agriculture blame LKN2030 for misrecognizing or 
rendering invisible their topics, as a result of a particular framing of climate 
neutrality. An important case in point is the activist group ’Parkveld blijft’, 
which struggles for safeguarding a green zone just outside the city centre 
which the municipal authorities have targeted for new land development, 
including offices, apartment building and houses. ‘How will you realize climate 
neutrality without Parkveld?’, the activists critically asked during a public 
debate on the topic. A number of them have squatted the terrain, and turned 
it into popular gardens as the linchpin of their campaign for the maintenance 
of the green zone and for the promotion of sustainable urban agriculture. 
Significantly, the reference to Leuven Climate Neutral 2030 operated as a key 
discursive tactic for the movement, whereby it also implicitly questioned the 
reduction of relevant emissions to scope 1 and 2. Interestingly, the website of 
LKN 2030 announced a number of activities of the group, which shows both 
that diverging voices are present in LKN2030 and that these divergences are 
tolerated to a certain extent.  
To be clear, our argument is not that buildings or mobility are no 
laudable policy priorities, nor that LKN2030 constructed the boundaries of the 
city in a false way, or that it ought to have included at least certain scope 3 
emissions. Any strategy for a sustainability transition will have to carve out a 
space within which it aims to realize specific changes. Precisely because the 
urban ‘stretches from the immediate environment to the remotest corners of 
the globe’ (Heynen et al., 2006; Swyngedouw and Kaika, 2014), one could 
argue that it is inherent to carbon neutrality projects to disregard certain 
types of emissions, and to draw the boundaries in a way that is always 
somewhat arbitrary.  
Our point is that this process of boundary construction is based on 
decisions that remain contingent and contestable, and that there is a problem 
if they are rendered invisible by a scientific or technical discourse (referring 
for instance to the so-called ‘immeasurability’ of scope 3 emissions). The 
boundaries by which a carbon neutral city is circumscribed are the object of 
political decisions that should remain contestable and that is what the 
emerging movement for sustainable urban agriculture in Leuven is doing to a 
certain extent. At the same time, the observation of the constructed nature 
of urban boundaries inevitably undermines the full meaning of ‘climate 
neutrality’ in the material sense of the term. It shows that this latter signifier 
remains relatively empty (Laclau, 1996), and that it is therefore unavoidably 
the object of a hegemonic process through which the spatial configuration of 
the city is constructed. As we will argue in what follows, not only the baseline 
measurement of carbon emissions in a city and the setting of priority targets, 
but also the specific timing of the project and the choice to mobilise particular 




4.2. Whither the city? Climate neutrality and the politics of time 
 
The attempt to make Leuven carbon neutral not only presupposes a spatial 
delineation of the city, but also entails a particular understanding of its 
temporality and historicity. In the philosophy of transition management, a 
process of change starts with the elaboration of an enthusing Leitbild, an ideal 
image of a sustainable future, rooted in contemporary developments and 
realities of the city. Although the scientific report of LKN2030 calls for a 
participatory process for the construction of such a Leitbild, no systematic 
attempt has been made so far to develop such an image, although Leitbilder 
have been developed with regard to specific issues and visioning is generally 
one of the key ingredients of LKN2030’s approach. For example, the scientific 
report ordered by LKN2030 advocates as a Leitbild the ‘33/33/33’ model for 
mobility, attributing an equal share to cars, bicycles and public transport 
(Jones et al., 2012).  
To a certain extent, this development of visions or Leitbilder amounts 
to an exercise in projecting a ‘concrete utopia’, to recycle a term Ernst Bloch 
(1986) developed in an entirely different context. In such imaginations, 
whether of a ‘Leitbild’ or a ‘concrete utopia’, the future is the dominant 
category. This contrasts with politicised conceptions where not the future but 
the ‘now moment’ is the dominant category, as is the case with Walter 
Benjamin’s understanding of time. In this context, Daniel Bensaïd points to 
the loss of political intensity in the now moment which might result from an 
attitude of patience inspired by a future utopian image. As he states, ‘there 
are delays which makes one miss an appointment. There are missed 
appointments which are irreparable’ (Bensaïd, 1995). As he argues, thinking 
politically requires not merely the projection of a better future, but the 
recognition in each now moment of a possibility to act. Looking forward to a 
utopian future should not be incompatible with a keen sense of the present, 
but in actual practice, this is often the result, Bensaïd suggests. Politicising 
time is thus not just about projecting a better future, but about grasping the 
possibilities and stakes of the present. 
 Although these quite sophisticated theoretical arguments emerged in 
another context, they do shed light on forms of depoliticisation in LKN2030’s 
relation to time. 2030 appeared far away on the moment the responsible 
alderman signed a declaration of intention in 2011. Decisive choices did not 
need to be made yet, so it seemed, or they can be patiently scheduled over a 
number of years. Everything is still possible … in the future. At the same time, 
Leuven can now already present itself as a green city, merely on the basis of 
its intention to become climate neutral at a later moment in time. In this way, 
the city government appears to play the game of time intelligently, already 
profiling itself as ‘green’ on the basis of future projects which might perhaps 
never be fully realised. However, faced with the reality of climate change, this 
game of time may turn not have been so intelligent after all. Is a lack of action 
here and now, hidden behind a seductive imagine of a sustainable utopia, still 
reparable in the future? 
In his reflections on political temporality, Walter Benjamin was mainly 
thinking about world-historical events such as the struggle against fascism, 
which required action in the ‘now moment’ to avert the coming catastrophe, 
and which could not be postponed until tomorrow. Understanding this 
requires a ‘full’ conception of time. This means that each moment carries its 
own possibilities for action and initiative, and that these possibilities can be 
lost when they are not seized at the ‘right’ moment. Many political theorists 
have stressed this dimension of ‘full’ time. Through his notion of ‘fortune’ 
Niccolò Machiavelli (1998) emphasised the importance of the right moment 
or ‘kairos’ to take decisive political action. Carl Schmitt (1988) stressed the 
need to decide at the moment of crisis (see also self-reference). Walter 
Benjamin (2007) especially denounced the notion of empty time 
underpinning the thought of social democrats who failed to understand the 
extent of the fascist danger in Germany in the 1930s and misrecognised that 
one could not postpone the struggle until tomorrow or schedule the struggle 
at wish (see also Bensaïd, 1990; Löwy, 2001). The time of the political is the 
time of events, which can occur unexpectedly, but which need to be seized 
upon, because when they are missed, the opportunity or possibility they 
provided will never recur. Such a full, political conception of time contrasts 
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with an ‘empty’ understanding of time, the time of the calendar, where each 
moment equals all others.  
If LKN2030 did not seize the momentum and the enthusiasm that the 
project triggered initially one can wonder whether a crucial moment was not 
missed. Is the same still possible in the future? Will citizens still be willing to 
engage in the same committed way and make the project into one of their 
own? Will companies still believe that something of importance is at stake 
and that they have something to win? Will a plurality of organisations still be 
interested in linking their engagements with LKN2030?  
Such questions can not only be asked with regard to the social and 
political dynamics of collective commitment. Something similar is at play with 
regard to the built environment, as infrastructural decisions can generate 
lock-ins for years to come. A case in point is the decision by the city council 
majority to build an underground car park with a capacity of 600 cars in the 
centre of the city. The scientific report drafted before the launch of LKN2030 
argues that 5000 extra parking places have to be built outside the city centre, 
and 3000 have to be suspended in the area within the ring road (Vandevyvere 
et al., 2013). The decision to build extra parking places within the city centre 
is therefore viewed as fundamentally at odds with the intentions of LKN2030 
as it will attract more cars to the city. Furthermore, critics, including within 
LKN2030, argue that it radically impedes more fundamental changes in the 
future as it will take decennia before the new parking’s costs are amortised. 
To quote one of the pioneers of LKN: ‘Building a new car park in the centre of 
Leuven is not compatible with the needed climate neutral transition path to 
an ultimately low-traffic city centre in 2030. Those who claim it is, 
demonstrate an outspoken form of cognitive dissonance’. Responding to this 
critique, the current chair of LKN2030 resorted to a typical techno-utopian 
argument. In a debate in November 2013 he stated he believed that by that 
time all cars would be electric so they would not be an issue for climate 
neutrality anymore. Adding another depoliticising discursive move, he urged 
the audience to be ‘optimistic’ and not to be overly critical: solutions will be 
found, so he argued. 
From the point of view of the concept of the political, what is of 
interest in this case is that a particular form of depoliticisation is key to 
understanding the deeper roots of this conflict. This is not merely a conflict 
between different agendas, between promise and practice, between high 
ambitions and a limited political will. It is rooted in a deeper chasm between 
an empty, depoliticised conception and a full, political conception of time. On 
the one hand, there is the idea that climate neutrality is to be built step by 
step, and what cannot be done today, will be solved tomorrow. Technological 
improvements will soon deliver affordable electric cars, downplaying the very 
threat extra car parks pose for the goals of LKN2030. In the future more will 
be possible than today anyway. This bet on the future relies on an empty and 
non-political conception of time, projecting the spontaneous arrival of 
technical solutions through a gradual progress.  
Underpinning the opposition movement’s discourse is a full 
conception of time: this is a missed opportunity, and a missed opportunity 
does not return, there is no second chance. In the words of a local politician: 
‘You don’t build an underground parking for five or ten year. If you build it, it 
is there for at least 60 or 70 year’ (Dessers, forthcoming). On the website of 
the action committee against the parking, which denounces the contrast 
between high climate ambitions and the construction of new car 
infrastructure, it is stated that ‘the car will not disappear from the city, it only 
becomes less visible’ (as the car is put under the ground) (DeBruulBrult, 2016). 
The 2030 goal is unreachable in this way, it is argued, and will have to be 
adjusted. To put it in our own conceptual vocabulary, if important ‘now 
moments’ are missed, the empty time of transition management becomes 
untenable anyhow. It is significant that the year ‘2030’ is increasingly dropped 
from the name of the initiative.  
The time of climate change is not empty and homogeneous, but ‘full’ 
and marked by critical thresholds and turning points. Similarly, the time for 
climate action is ‘now’, meaning that each and every political event or 
moment can be seized to make steps towards another socio-ecological future. 
A reliance on an empty conception of time means many ‘now moments’ can 
be missed. 
 




Originally four, and later five sectors were identified as key players that 
needed to get involved in order to make the city climate neutral: business, 
civil society, municipal authorities, knowledge institutions, and later also 
public utilities. Individuals selected from each category were first included in 
the project’s transition arena, and later in the board. Although they were all 
considered key to the success of the project, particular effort was done to get 
businesses involved. As the project depends for a big part on the latters’ 
‘green’ investments, their participation was seen as crucial. In order to 
persuade them, the possibility of green branding was strongly emphasised. 
For instance, in the promotion booklet it was stated that ‘all relevant 
stakeholders’ would be ‘put extensively in the spotlights’ (Jones et al., 2012), 
allowing them to benefit from their participation as it would give them a share 
of publicity. Moreover, the development of cost-neutral scenarios and the 
pursuit of win-win solutions were supposed to trigger business interest. After 
shortly introducing the background of LKN2030, the project proposal includes 
a long section entitled ‘green city branding’, which adopts a typical green 
economy discourse presenting climate change as an economic and 
technological opportunity. In the press conference launching LKN2030, 
reference was made to Copenhagen as an example of how a green city project 
can become ‘a catalyst for “Green Growth”’. The discourse is typically woven 
around nodal points such as ‘economic opportunities’, ‘Leuven as a 
pioneering example’, and ‘city marketing and image’, around which extensive 
communication campaigns are built. Following a transition management 
approach, the hope is that once business actors are part of the conversation, 
they will develop a more intrinsic motivation to engage in a sustainability 
transition (Loorbach, 2007). Through a process of dialogue and consensus-
seeking, initially instrumental or strategic motivations would thus be 
transcended or transformed. A crucial question is of course whether this also 
materialises in practice (self-reference).  
A transition arena is based on the idea that through in-depth 
conversations between so-called ‘important’ actors (Jones and De Meyere, 
2009) who are considered ‘frontrunners’ in their respective fields (Rotmans 
and Loorbach, 2009) consensus can be found on the need of a sustainability 
transition. Crucially, participants are asked to transcend power games and 
personal interests in order to arrive at a rational, genuine and fruitful kind of 
dialogue. Transition management thus follows a typical deliberative approach 
to decision-making (Dryzek, 2010). However, scholars such as Mouffe (2000) 
have convincingly criticised the limits of this deliberative approach, arguing 
that power cannot so easily be pushed aside, and interests do not disappear 
by ‘ignoring’ them (see also Machin, 2013). LKN2030 seems to be a case in 
point as it soon turned out that a gap was lurking between several actors’ 
commitment and their actual practices. Most notable is the case of a real 
estate project developer who got the opportunity to set up the largest 
sustainable housing project in an urban centre in Flanders, including 1200 
residential units on a terrain of 11 hectares, within the framework of 
LKN2030. However, despite promises to integrate and preserve old buildings 
that are part of the cultural patrimony of the city, after just a few years the 
officially protected buildings are left unattended and in a dilapidated state, 
and will be bought and rescued by the municipality. The company sold off 
non-profitable parts (including a kindergarten and social housing project), let 
inhabitants overpay for maintaining the new buildings, and as the symbolic 
drop in the bucket, sprayed weed killers on adjacent lawns. Inhabitants sent 
a letter to the LKN2030 secretariat announcing their disengagement from the 
project as long as the company remains part of its executive committee.  
This brings us to the question who is included in the transition arena, 
or more recently the board of LKN2030, and who is not, and why that is the 
case. According to post-foundational political theory (Marchart, 2007), who is 
part of leading institutions in society, and how these present themselves to 
citizens is of key importance. For Lefort (1988), for example, representatives 
hold a mirror to society, as they  display the latter’s composition, its key 
principles and values, making these not only visible but also contestable (see 
also Weymans, 2005). From that perspective, the question becomes what 
kind of city we have when actors like the involved project developer are key 
members of what constitutes LKN2030’s decisive organ, or what image the 
city gives of itself when a small set of ‘system thinkers’ can chart a process of 
change that is supposed to have a determinative effect on its future as a 
whole? Whether transition managers acknowledge this or not, the 
participants in the transition arena (or in other leading organs such as the 
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board) are representatives in a certain way, and it is of crucial importance to 
recognise this.  
Within the transition management approach participants are 
supposed to participate on their ‘personal account’, thus not representing 
anyone apart from themselves (Van der Brugge and Rotmans, 2007). The 
hope is that this will facilitate the process to arrive at a common problem 
definition and goal. Within the framework of a deliberative theory of 
democracy this is defendable as it is not so important who is represented, the 
key question being whether all relevant arguments can be heard (Geenens, 
2007). However, from a democratic point of view, such an approach can have 
problematic implications (self-reference). As Flor Avelino (2009) states, to opt 
for this particular group of people can be very exclusionary. Furthermore, in 
many transition initiatives, the selection of specific actors who are considered 
‘important’ or ‘frontrunners’ is not made in a very transparent way (self-
reference, see also Hendriks, 2009). This is not different in LKN2030. The basic 
mechanism is one of co-optation, whereby the initiators select and include 
specific people they know or deem interesting or influential. While the choice 
to work with a transition arena is often inspired by an attempt to facilitate 
new forms of participation, the dynamic it engenders can impede broader 
forms of participation by citizens or civil society groups that are not involved. 
Moving beyond a typical transition management approach, LKN2030 tried to 
compensate for this by complementing its transition arena with six thematic 
cells and a limited number of climate parliaments which were meant to give 
a voice to a broader range of citizens. Yet, while these parliaments were 
generally considered as successful and interesting, attracting a few hundreds 
of voluntary participants, they did not really counterweigh the democratic 
deficit as they functioned primarily as mechanisms of consultation. Whereas 
citizens got a voice, they did not get a vote.  
Importantly, participation cannot simply be equated with democracy. 
From the point of view of post-foundational political theory, contestability 
and the capacity of a society to recognise and fairly deal with its dividedness 
is much more important, and participation is actually seen as the paradoxical 
result of this (Lefort, 1988; Mouffe, 2006; Rancière, 1999). It is by staging 
division and making visible that something profound is at stake, that citizens 
are challenged to take sides and participate in the conversation. Making 
dividedness visible is, for instance, one of the key symbolic contributions of 
the majority/opposition split in parliamentary democracy, which shows to 
society that it is divided but that this division or disagreement is legitimate 
(Lefort, 1988; self-reference). This is not meant to idealise the classic forms of 
parliamentary democracy, quite the contrary, though it is important to see 
what is lost by opting for new forms of governance and participation. The 
crucial question, again, is how the city is imagined or represented. Projects of 
city-wide multistakeholder governance, like LKN2030, give a very specific and 
depoliticised representation or image of urban society, based on all-round 
cooperation and inclusiveness, while they are actually led by a very particular 




5. Conclusion: between city marketing and repoliticisation 
 
As is often the case with eco-city projects, the very limited progress towards 
carbon neutrality stands in sharp contrast with the high ambitions formulated 
originally (Cook and Swyngedouw, 2012; Swyngedouw and Kaika, 2014). 
Materially, not so much has changed, but in the case of Leuven, important 
symbolic changes have taken place: climate neutrality has become key to the 
city’s self-image, as a result of which critical local issues, discussions and 
agendas are (re)framed. Importantly, it is also on this symbolic, discursive or 
representational level that processes of (de)politicisation have to be judged.  
Crucially, symbols are of key importance for launching or inhibiting effective 
dynamics of change. At the same time, they can also conceal their political 
stakes. Through its appropriation for divergent policy agendas, ‘climate 
neutrality’ has started to function as a ‘tendentially empty signifier’ (Laclau, 
1996; 2001), fitting within diverging hegemonic projects, including both 
oppositional movements for radical sustainable alternatives and city 
marketing initiatives. The focus on city marketing is politically significant, as 
the general interest of the city is thus framed in terms of a logic of marketing, 
economic opportunities and competition. The result is not only that the 
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political stake of the project is submerged in an economic and managerial 
discourse. What was originally intended as a ‘means’ (a green economy or city 
marketing discourse in order to get business actors on board) soon became 
an ‘end’ in itself.  
At the same time, the signifier of ‘climate neutrality’ can also be 
appropriated and resymbolised by other actors, and can in this way become 
the starting point for processes of repoliticisation. Indeed, precisely because 
the term is tendentially emptied, it can also provide symbolic support for the 
democratic expression of disagreement by movements who advocate radical 
sustainable alternatives. The opposition to the construction of a new car 
parking, pitting the city council majority against some (other) protagonists of 
LKN2030, the movement for safeguarding agricultural land in Leuven, and the 
call to exclude the real estate project developer referred to above from the 
LKN2030 board are telling illustrations of how the symbolic reframing of the 
city has also provided opposition movements with new discursive weapons. 
In this sense, ‘the political’ returns, manifesting itself through a number of 
tensions and potential fault lines that have developed during the last years. 
These examples also show that a project such as LKN2030 can never 
be as homogenous as it might appear on the basis of its official documents. A 
myriad of people, initiatives, opinions and strategies are involved, which are 
not always compatible. Importantly, this should not be seen as a problem. In 
a paradoxical way, conflict and opposition can raise the stakes of a policy 
project, as it can help mobilise the citizenry and enhance popular participation 
around it (Balibar, 1992, 1998, 2003; Mouffe, 2000; Rancière, 1999). Strong 
and visible disagreements on key notions such as climate neutrality, on what 
it should include and how it should be put into practice, can challenge 
previously uninvolved actors to take a stance, speak out and broaden the 
debate. In other words, conflict and contestation (or to put it differently: 
politicisation) can enhance democratic participation and involvement, 
because they make clear that something important is at stake. If the 
discussion takes place only within a consensual atmosphere, confined within 
the boundaries of a well-defined transition arena, it can never have such a 
dynamising and mobilising effect.  
In a paradoxical way, one of the merits of LKN2030 is therefore that it 
has provided new starting points for debate and contestation and thus for 
processes of politicisation, even though its own discourse remains strongly 
post-political. Whichever social or environmental movement that emerges in 
the future will be able to refer to the cleavage between the ambitious 
objectives and the actual practices of the project. Social and ecological protest 
can gain legitimacy precisely because it can turn the city’s own Leitbild and 
objectives against its actual policy practices. In an interesting way, even post-
political projects can thus generate symbols that can be turned into starting 
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